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"If man has good corn, or wood, or boards, or pigs to sell, or can make better chairs 
or knives, crucibles, or church organs, than anybody else, you will find a broad, hard-
beaten road to his house, though it be in the woods." 
... Ralph Waldo Emerson 
The term "Technology Transfer" is relatively new. A common interpretation suggests 
that within research institutions, such as the universities, government labs, or 
industrial labs, there is a treasure chest of great ideas that, if unlocked, could create 
thousands of new products that could not only stimulate our economy, but also renew 
our leadership in technology and generally be a great benefit to mankind. Others 
interpret "technology transfer" as simply marketing a better mousetrap. 
The perspective of venture capital towards technology transfer depends upon the 
investment strategy of the fund, its size and the motivations of its general partners. 
First, technology only becomes interesting to venture capital after the research phase 
is completed. This is the very earliest stage of consideration towards building a 
company on technology that is yet to be developed. First round, or "seed" level, 
investments generally range from $50,000 to $250,000. A fund with $50-100 million 
of committed capital simply cannot afford to make such a small investment, 
recognizing that a "seed" investment takes as much or more time to properly monitor 
than an investment of $1-5 million. 
Secondly, very few funds invest at the "seed level" simply because it represents 
higher risk and becomes a time consuming effort on the part of the general partner, 
that is, to structure a company from its very beginning. A more typical venture 
investment is focused on companies that have management in place, a proven 
technology, and are in a position to experience rapid growth. 
With that overview, let me present a series of slides which describe the Columbine 
Funds and specific investments in technologies that are mostly university based. 
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(SLIDE 1 - COLUMBINE PROFILE) 
Columbine consists of two funds, the first of which was closed in 1984 at $34 million 
and the second closed in 1989 at $44 million. There are four general partners, two of 
whom are located in Denver, one in Phoenix, and one in Houston. There are 44 
limited partners, nine of which are located outside of the United States. They consist 
mainly of pension funds, insurance companies, major corporations, and individuals. 
We have a portfolio of 37 investments. Most important is our investment strategy 
with three major elements - seed and startup level investing, technology driven (with 
a proprietary position), and located primarily in Texas and the lower four states of the 
mountain states. 
(SLIDE 2 - COLUMBINE, UNIVERSITY-SOURCED STARTUPS) 
The next two slides list 17 companies, their university relationship, the nature of the 
product, and their current status. 
Afferon, University of Arizona, has also acquired a license from the NIH in order to 
provide complete proprietary protection. The product, originally developed to control 
urinary urge incontinence, has proven to have applications in other areas such as 
diabetic neuropathy. 
Agripro, University of Nevada at Reno, focused initially on hybrid wheat, has proven 
to be a technical failure. The company was acquired by a major corporation prior to 
the discovery of the technical problems. 
Albion, University of Utah, using Raman spectroscopy, allowed a patient specific 
anesthesia gas monitor. It was acquired by Ohmeda. 
Anesta, University of Utah, developed a method of delivering a anesthetic drug to a 
child by way of a lollipop. This was a small investment five years ago. No product 
sales to date, but very active. 
Biex, University of California-Davis, is developing a simple test for preterm labor. 
CardioPulmonics, University of Utah, has developed a method using hollow fibers to 
oxygenate the blood and create a major lung assist device. Although the company 
has just completed Phase I clinicals and does not expect FDA approval for perhaps 
two years, a successful public offering was completed in January 1992. 
Collagenex, developed with initial funding by Johnson & Johnson, working with the 
State University of New York and now entering Phase Ill clinicals, now appears to 
have not only the potential of an effective control of periodontitis, but other 
applications as well. 
Hepatix, Baylor University, is in Phase I clinicals for a liver assist device which has 
already demonstrated its effectiveness on one patient with a rare liver disease which 
is normally terminal. 
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(SLIDE 3 - COLUMBINE, UNIVERSITY-SOURCED STARTUPS - Cont'd.) 
Krysalis, University of New Mexico, demonstrated a new material which allowed the 
construction of a non-volatile memory chip. We were unable to secure funding after 
three years and the company was shut down. 
Nanophase, Argonne Labs, involved a very fine ceramic powder allowing the molding 
of malleable ceramic. Although the company is still active, it is not likely we will 
invest further. 
Neogen, Michigan State University, was an economic development initiative without a 
major proprietary technology. In attempts to survive, unrelated products were 
developed and the company lost its focus, resulting in a relatively unsuccessful public 
offering. 
OrthoLogic, Montana State University where it was demonstrated that a low power 
resonant frequency was capable of moving a calcium ion facilitating bone growth. 
They are reasonably close to an FDA response to their PMA and have recently 
completed a successful public offering. 
Paradigm, organized to search for a company in the electronics area, based upon 
technology from the University of Texas, has not proved viable. 
Receptor Labs, University of llinois, is based upon the ability to identify specific 
peptides far more rapidly than current technology allows. The jury is still out as to 
whether the technology will be effective. 
Rhodon is based upon the research of a world-class scientist at MD Anderson 
Hospital. The possibility of a simple test to determine the prognosis of metastatic 
disease following breast cancer surgery looks very promising. Similar tests for other 
types of cancer metastasis appear to be possible. 
Topometrix, originally out of CalTech, has developed into a successful company 
capable of digitizing and visualizing atomic-sized surface particles. At $1 O million in 
revenues and growing, we expect them to be the dominant player in this market. 
TSA, developed at Utah State, had a product intended to be a simple colorizer drug 
analysis. However, a combination of the technology and a weak market position 
caused its demise. 
(SLIDE 4 - CONCLUSIONS FROM COLUMBINE'S UNIV. SOURCED 
TECHNOLOGY) 
Some conclusions from the university-based technology investments are that 
approximately 60%, or 1 O out of 17, are medical. Two are agricultural, two are 
instruments, and two are electronics. The government lab startup is the only 
materials technology. 
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Sources are diverse, that is from 14 different institutions. Very few of these 
opportunities merit a startup investment. 
The success rate is high with three companies going public with successful IPO's; 
two were acquired, two failed, and ten are still very active. 
(SLIDE 5 - IS IT A PRODUCT OR A BUSINESS?) 
The first question that needs to be asked is, "Is it a product or a business?" Most 
opportunities are products which in themselves cannot sustain a business and should 
be licensed to existing companies. Some simple tests to determine if the technology 
is indeed a basis for a startup: 
1. Market size of at least $100 million per year with the company capable of 
$30 million per year in revenues within five years. 
2. It must have a strong proprietary position. 
3. A basic technology capable of developing a pipeline of products sufficient 
to sustain corporate development. 
4. Knowledgeable founders who are reasonable to deal with. 
For instance, a founder who insists he or she will not give up 51 % ownership 
of the company will not secure venture capital financing. 
5. The investment or license must be available on reasonable terms. 
(SLIDE 6 - VENTURE CAPITALIST OBJECTIVES) 
Venture capitalist objectives are clear: To create a successful company capable of 
being acquired or supporting an IPO in five to seven years. The company should 
make an outstanding return on investment of meaningful size to the fund. The 
venture capitalist must be able to influence the company through the board of 
directors assisting with the hiring of management, establishing short and long range 
strategies, and support the financing of the company, balancing financing against 
development benchmarks. 
A major objective is to keep the equity investment low, nominally $5-1 O million total, 
and to efficiently use its capital. 
Manage risk by investing in stages. 
(SLIDE 7 - UNIVERSITY OBJECTIVES) 
Some university objectives are to create value from technology, to stimulate student 
interest, to satisfy and retain faculty, to generate research support, avoid conflicts, 
and to foster local economic development. 
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(SLIDE 8 - LESSONS LEARNED - 1) 
Lessons are learned generally from mistakes. 
1. Protect the patent position. The inherent conflict is that researchers build a 
reputation by authoring technical papers. Such disclosures can destroy a 
patent opportunity. 
2. The university should not select a CEO, but let the venture capitalists build 
the management team. 
3. Be careful with whom you deal, checking references and past business 
associates. 
(SLIDE 9 - LESSONS LEARNED - 2) 
Other lessons are the following: 
1. Few opportunities have real startup potential. 
2. Faculty does not have to quit. 
3. There is good science at all universities. 
4. Analyze the patent position carefully seeking at least a second opinion. 
5. Involve the university through stock, support for research, etc. 
6. Get a founding CEO (part-time, if necessary) involved early. 
7. Market issues are the most common reasons for failure. 
8. Set up an off-campus company office immediately. 
9. Avoid complex structures. 
10. If, for whatever reason, the arrangement is not satisfactory to all parties, 
retreat gracefully. 
(SLIDE 10 - BENEFITS TO UNIVERSITY/FACULTY) 
Certain benefits should accrue to the university and/or faculty. First, the value of 
stock or equity ownership is much greater than royalties or license fees. 
Certain research support should accrue from the startup. 
A startup company in proximity to the campus keeps the technology in state, boosts 
economic development, and generates local jobs. 
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Participating in a corporate growth is more satisfying to faculty and therefore helps 
attract and retain faculty. 
A local startup allows universities to retain more influence on the technology than 
through a straight license or royalty. 
(SLIDE 11 - SOME POTENTIAL PROBLEMS) 
Potential problems can involve loss of faculty, potential conflicts of interest, and loss 
of control. Most commonly, university/faculty do not understand stock ownership and 
investment mechanisms. 
An equity investment postpones short term cash royalty income for a less certain 
stock value in the future. Without good communications and careful consideration, 
there can be a clash of business and academic values. 
(SLIDE 12 - CONFLICTS OF INTEREST) 
Examples of conflicts of interest is the use of public funds for private gain. The 
discipline of research contracts versus normal academic freedom may inhibit 
creativity. There must be a clear understanding of the allocation of faculty time and 
their loyalty. Issues can be delicate, such as explaining the process to those who do 
not participate nor benefit. 
How does the university split up the pie? Who negotiates the agreement? 
Adding to the complication and peculiar only to medical developments is the need for 
clinical trials to satisfy FDA requirements. 
(SLIDE 13 - VALUATION AND OWNERSHIP) 
Valuation and ownership are generally the result of subjective judgment. The value 
of a company depends upon a number of characteristics such as the amount of 
research funds expended to date, the stage of development (Is it still research?), the 
size of the ultimate business, etc. How much capital is needed to complete product 
development and manage clinical testing over an extended period to secure FDA 
approval? What are the competitive alternatives or threats? Is the proprietary 
position secured through strong patents, proprietary processes, or manufacturing 
know-how? Technology assessment by industry experts can be very helpful. 
(SLIDE 14 - SOME GUIDELINES) 
Certain guidelines are fundamental to a good basis for company development. 
Stock ownership is an equitable substitute for lump sum cash payments. If royalties 
are involved, they are paid only when sales are made. A license to patents or 
proprietary information must be exclusive. Any minimum royalties are due only when 
sales start. Any agreement should provide that technology reverts to the owner if not 
commercialized diligently and timely. Research contracts should include very low or 
no overhead. 
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Principle: University, founders, and venture capitalists are in partnership where value 
is created through increases in the stock price. No one party should extract income 
before the others. 
(SLIDE 15 - SOME MYTHS) 
Some common myths regarding business startups are as follows: 
1. Faculty must leave the university to start a company. 
2. Startup capital is scarce. 
3. All really good technology is on the coasts. 
4. Venture capitalists give research grants. 
5. The business development part is easy. 
6. A professor can be a CEO. 
7. Stock is of no value. 
8. Royalties maximize income. 
The following four slides demonstrate a typical sequence of investment in a 
successful company. Although the subject company example has one founder, a 
university based technology might involve perhaps two faculty inventors, a 
department, and the university or its foundation all representing, in aggregate, the 
founders' portion. 
(SLIDE 16 - STARTUP INVESTMENT) 
The valuation, agreed to by the founder and the investor, is a subjective judgment 
post investment value ($900,000 pre-money plus $100,000 cash). 
(SLIDE 17 - FIRST ROUND INVESTMENT) 
Investors usually include the seed round investor plus other venture capital funds. 
Again, a new yet subjective valuation. 
(SLIDE 18 - SECOND ROUND INVESTMENT) 
Investor base may include an institution or corporate partner at a much higher 
valuation reflecting a maturing high growth company. 
(SLIDE 19 - PUBLIC FINANCING IPO) 
The beginning of a public company which provides a means to liquidity for prior 
investors and the founders. Note that acquisition by a large public firm at this stage 
would result in a similar valuation. This is a very successful company, but not equal 
to the performance of a local company, Exabyte in 1989. 
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Before leaving the subject of venture capital, I am always compelled to reflect on 
venture capital as an industry and its effect on maintaining America's technology 
leadership. In my opinion, the ability of venture capital to accelerate the development 
of technology into commercial, useable products has been one of America's best 
kept secrets. 
I am also reminded that there has been in place since 1982, a government program 
called the "Small Business Innovation Research Act" which was recently reauthorized 
and expanded at the conclusion of the Bush administration. The SBIR program since 
its inception has generated more commercialization of new products than any other 
government program in history. A high percentage of the companies in our portfolio 
have SBIR grants either active or awarded sometime in their development. 
Finally, it is clear that the increasing attention to technology transfer, be it from 
universities, government labs, or an inventor's garage, combined with government 
support funding such as the SBIR program, venture capital or corporate investment, 
is without question critically important to maintain our country's leadership in the 
commercialization of new technology. 
